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ABSTRACT. Certain problems with standard two-dimensional semantics are 
addressed and cases in which these problems arise explored. In such cases the 
primary intension cannot be univocally mapped in one and only one indexical 
world, thus standard two-dimensional semantics cannot efficiently address the 
problems presented. Subsequently, a modified model is presented which leads these 
problems to be averted in the replicated cases. This modified model admits primary 
intensions that are not univocally mapped. The conclusion discusses the advantages 
and disadvantages of the modified model and analyzes its possible consequences 
for the philosophy of mind. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How should one account for the linguistic use of phrases such as, “Russia 
might not have been the largest country in the world”, even when the 
largest country in the world is Russia? We cannot say that the quote means 
Russia might not have been Russia. However, it does have a meaning. As 
many philosophers would agree, the statement roughly indicates that the 
object we refer to when we speak of Russia is an object of this world, 
which, when considered counterfactually – as all the things it could have 
been in other possible worlds – might not have been the largest country in 
at least one of these worlds. One of the main formalizations of the solution 
to this dilemma is known as two-dimensional semantics. We say that 
Russia has a two-dimensional meaning.  One is the function which maps 
“Russia” in our world – the indexical world, the world to which we belong 
– called primary intension; one is the class of functions which maps 
"Russia" in all other possible worlds, called secondary intension. 
Secondary intensions may appear as improbable ideas. Accordingly, 
some would find the notion that something belongs to other possible 
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worlds imaginative; useful in fiction but not in philosophy. Conversely, 
primary intensions always appeared much better behaved, since we ought 
to have the right to make expressions about our own world. Primary 
intensions, however, are arrogant foes indeed. Under what grounds would 
we have the right to isolate only one world and then map entities on only 
this particular world? We would indeed have to possess extremely fine 
grained information about our placement in the vast realm of possible 
worlds.1 If we cannot have all the relevant knowledge which would be true 
in one and only one possible world, how can we single out only one of 
them as indexical? We must ascribe indexicality to all the worlds in which 
what is both believed and true would in fact obtain, that is be true. But if, 
behaving humbly, we do so, then how can the primary intension be just one 
function and not a class of functions on all the worlds that could be 
indexical?  
Enquiring more generally, how can we presume that we can speak of 
one indexical world and select an object in that world in a univocal 
fashion? Who gave us the power to choose the indexical world from among 
all the other epistemically indistinguishable worlds? Who filled us with the 
necessary divinity to track the untraceable and find the identical hay in the 
haystack? Can we subscribe to a more humble theory of primary intensions 
and continue to account properly for counterfactuals? After a brief 
introduction to standard two-dimensional semantics, a problem case will be 
presented in which these enquiries will be enacted, revealing faults with 
this standard model. A modified model where those faults do not arise will 
be introduced and its consequences for David Chalmer's arguments against 
physicalism will be explored. 
 
2. Two-Dimensional Semantics 
 
In Chalmers (2006),2 two-dimensional semantics is summarized as the 
concept whereby meanings are intensions divided into two dimensions. 
One is a function mapping entities in our world (primary intension) and one 
is a class of functions mapping these same entities on other worlds 
(secondary intension). According to this framework, when we say, “Russia 
might not have been the largest country in the world”, we are using the 
secondary intension of the word ‘Russia'. This claim is therefore true 
because it is logically possible to have a country larger than Russia. Hence, 
there are possible worlds in which Russia is not the largest country in the 
world and since the sentence is true in that world, it is true for the 
secondary intension of Russia. When we say, “Russia is the largest country 
in the world,” we are using the primary intension, and this claim is true 
because, in the world in which we live (the indexical world), there is not 
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any country larger than Russia. When using the secondary intension, we 
establish another possibility because we are referring to Russia in many 
other possible worlds; we are allowing mappings across unbounded worlds 
without constraining such mapping to our own specific world. When using 
the primary intension, we make a univocal statement about only one 
specific world (or centered world) – our own.  
Chalmers (1996) suggests that the primary and secondary intensions 
correspond to functions as follows. The primary intension is a function 
from the possible world where the individual is located (W*) to the referent 
(R). That is, it maps a whole possible world to a subset of itself, called the 
referent: 
f1 : W* → R 
 
After the primary intension is fixed, the secondary intension will map this 
same referent on the image of the primary intension but on all other 
possible worlds. Therefore, it will be equivalent to a family of functions 
from the ordered pair of indexical world and possible worlds (W*, Wn) to 
the referent (R), which is now a subset of each possible world:3 
f2 : (W*, Wn) → R 
 
 
 
3. The problem 
 
In this paper, I argue against the position held by most classical two-
dimensionalists that the indexical world in which the reference is fixed is 
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only one. It will be argued that since we cannot single out only one 
indexical world out of all equally epistemically indistinguishable worlds, 
the primary intension cannot be univocal. For instance, there may be, in 
fact, two largest countries in our world. We can conceive the logical 
possibility that our own world contains a hidden country as large as Russia 
as well as the possibility it does not contain such country. Both these 
worlds are indistinguishable under incomplete information, both of them 
must be equally our own, and there shall be one primary intension’s 
function mapping the referent in each one of them. The primary intension 
cannot arbitrarily choose one of them rather than using both. Therefore, 
Russia's primary intension shall be not only one mapping but be one 
mapping for every possible epistemically indistinguishable indexical world. 
The primary intension cannot map the one and only indexical world to 
Russia simpliciter, for there is more than one possibility for the indexical 
world. In essence, then, there are too many uncertainties about which is our 
indexical world to enable univocal mappings on it. 
 
4. The problem case 
 
The example of an unknown country as large as Russia reveals that there 
may be a problem with the necessary univocality of primary intensions. 
However, the example reveals little about how this problem arises inside 
the conceptual framework of two-dimensional semantics and little in 
relation to the type of solution to the problem. Thus, another more 
elaborate case is needed.  
First, consider the following thought experiment. A physical description 
of Kurt Gödel is given to an individual named Joey, and he is also told that 
Gödel is the philosopher who formulated the incompleteness theorems; 
taken together these will be Gödel’s description composing his intension. 
Joey is placed in one possible world and asked to identify Gödel. If this is a 
world in which someone fits Gödel’s description, then Gödel's primary 
intension will map the most Gödel-like object – the entity which most 
accurately fits the description given – that belongs to the possible world in 
question. The most Gödel-like object of a world will be denoted by Gj, in 
which j is the index of the possible world, and the property of being the 
most Gödel-like object that Joey can find will be called by "Gödelity" for 
brevity. When Joey makes counterfactual statements about Gödel, he will 
use the fixed Gj as a reference. That is, when he says that Gödel might have 
formulated Tarski’s semantical conception of truth, he will be talking about 
this same fixed Gj but in a possible world in which Gödel formulated that 
concept. However, bear in mind that depending on which world Joey is 
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placed in, the primary intension will map a different Gj that can possess a 
diverse set of properties as long his Gödelity is preserved. Gj can vary in 
diverse ways. Some of them proved the completeness theorems, whereas 
others did not. In one, the Gödel-like entity might have died of starvation, 
whereas, in another, it might have died in a car accident. If it is guaranteed 
that all of the possibilities are Gödel-like, then Joey will identify one of 
these individuals as Gödel if Joey is placed in one of the possible worlds in 
which a Gödel-like individual exists, provided this individual has the 
property of Gödelity. That is, if Joey finds someone who fits the given 
description (i.e., it is Gödel-like) and if nothing else he finds fits the 
description better (i.e. it has Gödelity), Joey will identify the individual as 
Gödel as fix the reference as such. 
It is relevant to note that if Joey does not have complete knowledge of 
his own world, he will not know for certain in which of these worlds he 
was placed; his primary intension can be mapping any of those Gj who 
belong to any of those Wj that are epistemically indistinguishable for him. 
When Joey thinks about where he is in the infinite ocean of possible 
worlds, he can conjecture whether he is in the world in which Gödel does 
or does not do all of the things that Gödel may have done while preserving 
his Gödelity and the facts he came to acquire about Gödel. Joey may or 
may not learn which one of these possibilities became actualized. 
Arguably, he will never know all of the relevant information and his 
knowledge of Gödel will always be insufficient for him to determine 
precisely with which world he is engaged. Thus, although he is in only one 
world, he does not know enough about Gödel to know exactly which world 
he is in. However, he can narrow down the possibilities by updating his 
knowledge with respect to relevant information. 
Now, a more concrete and detailed example will be built. Let W1 to W5 
be all five possible worlds that exist in our fictional scenario; let Jn and Gn 
denote, respectively, Joey and Gödel from world Wn. The worlds are 
characterized as follows: 
W1: G1 died in a car accident and had a lover, but J1 (Joey from W1) only 
knows the initial fact because Gödel conveniently keeps his lover a secret. 
W2: G2 died in a car accident and had two lovers, but J2 does not know 
about the lovers. 
W3: G3 died of starvation, and no one knows about a lover. 
W4: G4 died of starvation and had a secret lover J4 does not know about. 
W5: G5 died in a car accident and had no lovers. 
 
Joey knows all of the information listed in this characterization, while not 
knowing in which world he is. Suppose Joey comes to know Gödel died of 
starvation, even if informed by all the characterizations above, worlds 3 
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and 4 will look exactly the same to him; he cannot tell the two worlds 
apart.4 The same is true for worlds 1 and 2, if Joey knows about the car 
accident and nothing else, he cannot tell these two apart. J1 and J2 are 
subjectively indistinguishable with respect to their information about 
Gödel, whereas J3 has different information, i.e., that Gödel died of 
starvation instead of in a car accident. Although J1 and J2 are subjectively 
indistinguishable, G1 and G2 differ. Therefore, when J1 and J2 use Gödel's 
primary intension and fix its reference, they do so with different referents. 
Although using the same definition of Gödel, J3 will find a Gödel who died 
of a different cause and is therefore subjectively distinguishable from J1 
and J2. For J1 and J2 the secondary intension of Gödel will correspond to G4 
and G5. Provided that the secondary and primary intensions cannot 
intercept, the secondary intension of J3 will correspond to G5 but not to G4, 
because as far J3 knows he can be in W4. Although the question of the 
possible interception of the mapping of secondary and primary intensions 
has its own merit, one of the most difficult questions one can ask about this 
fictional scenario is the following: in the end, does J3 fix his reference as 
G3 or G4? As far as J3 knows he might be in W3 or W4; what grounds would 
justify a preference for either? Nonetheless, in the standard model, J3 must 
choose one of the two. Yet to him, they are all identical. Thus, J3 would 
have to make a choice between two indistinguishables and use some type 
of choice function. This choice would not by any means be a trivial matter 
because any choice function is not even mathematically constructible. In 
fact, outside the realm of pure mathematics, it seems impossible to make 
this type of choice. If J3 has agreed with the standard model of two-
dimensional semantics, he is in a very awkward position indeed.  
 
5. Proposed new model 
 
Joey has a better alternative. He can use both W3 and W4. From an 
omnipresent perspective, even if we can know which world he is in, Joey 
still does not have access to that information that would justify a preference 
for either W3 or W4. Thus, in this modified model, the primary intension is 
a family of functions, each one mapping entities on each epistemically 
indistinguishable indexical world. There are as many referents mapped by 
the primary intension as there are worlds in which the epistemic subject's 
factual knowledge about the referent is identical – even if each of them 
lives in a different world with a different referent.  Thus, according to the 
standard model, we have: 
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According to the modified model, we have: 
 
In our problem case, J3 will fix the reference by creating two different 
functions each one mapping Gödel on W3 and W4, all of them 
indistinguishable to him. In fact, J4 will also do the same, while J1 and J2 
will have each two different functions one in W1 another in W2. In that 
manner, one can solve the problem of choosing between indistinguishable 
worlds by using all of them. Evidently, as the epistemic subject learns 
about the world he can then adapt his mapping accordingly by excluding 
some of the worlds and fine graining his primary intension. He cannot, 
however, start with a completely precise and univocal primary intension, 
for that would assume he knows exactly to which world he belongs.  
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Let {Wέ} be the set of all epistemically indistinguishable worlds for the 
epistemic subject έ, then our humble primary intension would map one 
referent for each member of {Wέ},  taking the form:  
f1 : {Wέ} → R 
 
6. Some consequences  
 
In this modified model, the concept of epistemic possibility has either a 
weaker sense or no sense at all. According to standard usage, a belief about 
the world is primarily possible if it is possible that the world in which the 
belief is satisfied is the indexical world, or in other words, if the epistemic 
subject does not know the belief's negation. However, in the modified 
model, those conditions could be met even if it remains the case the 
epistemic subject is in a world where the belief is false. The epistemic 
subject might not know a belief's negation, for he cannot know if he is in 
the world where that belief obtains or not; while in fact being in a world 
where the belief is certainly false. One might still decide to call that belief 
epistemically possible. However, it should be noted this would be a weaker 
epistemic possibility where it could be the case that the epistemic subject is 
in a world where the belief is false and, notwithstanding the belief’s 
falsehood, one would say such belief is epistemically possible. The issue 
lies in an uncertainty regarding the true value of primarily possible beliefs. 
On the modified model, the primary intension is fixed in all epistemic 
indistinguishable worlds. As long as at least one of the worlds makes the 
belief true, then it will be primarily possible. However, the epistemic 
subject can be in one of the worlds where the belief is false, and a false 
belief cannot be knowledge. It is still defensible that, since the epistemic 
subject does not know in which world he lives, the primarily possible belief 
is still epistemically possible, from his point of view. However, this is not 
the same as showing all instances of primary possibility entails epistemic 
possibility. For instance, it could be the case that a primary intension is true 
in only one world out of the many equally epistemically indistinguishable 
worlds where the primary intension will be fixed. While we would like to 
say the belief is primarily possible, it is not clear we would say each 
instance of it, in each world, is epistemically possible. If there is a world 
where the primary intension is true, while being false in all other equally 
epistemically indistinguishable worlds, will it still be epistemically possible 
in all those worlds? 
Perhaps, one could recast Chalmers’ arguments using this weaker 
epistemic possibility. Nevertheless, in this modified model, even if primary 
non-ideal conceivability entails primary possibility (Chalmers, 2003), it 
seems it will not necessarily entail the standard two-dimensional 
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conception of epistemic possibility; at best we might claim it entails the 
weaker epistemic possibility whereby one can be in a world where a belief 
is false but, provided one does not know that, the belief would still be 
epistemically possible. Chalmers (2003) argues that primary ideal 
conceivability entails primary possibility, and although he may have 
persuasive arguments for this position, it seems that philosophers are 
forever doomed to be ensnared by non-ideal conceivability. Joey may 
believe that he lives in a world in which Gödel did not have a lover because 
such a world may, as far as he knows, be the indexical world. Therefore, he 
can non-ideally conceive that such a world may be the one in which he 
lives; although he lives in a world in which Gödel had a lover. 
Accordingly, Joey has a false belief that is epistemically possible in this 
weaker sense. If we simply debunk that primary non-ideal conceivability 
implies standard epistemic possibility, as Chalmers argues, then this 
debunking will, in turn, have consequences for the strong arguments by 
Chalmers against physicalist versions of monism. Thus, inside this 
framework, it might be possible to formulate a strong version of monism in 
which philosophical zombies are not epistemically possible only because 
they are non-ideally conceivable. On the other hand, it is not necessarily 
the case that we can completely save monism with this new framework. 
Claiming it is primarily non-ideally conceivable that we live in a world 
where monism holds and there is no consciousness would still entail that 
under monism a world without consciousness is epistemically possible in 
that weaker sense; that is, we do not know if we live in a world with or 
without it and hence, arguably appropriately, should fix our reference on 
both options. Therefore, it will still be the case that there will be no strong 
supervenience of consciousness on monism. However, the consequences of 
this new framework to supervenience require a separate detailed 
investigation to be conducted in a later paper. It should perhaps be 
considered a feature rather than a fault that, according to monism, the 
primary intension of consciousness is fixed in both types of worlds; that is, 
both in the worlds where consciousness exists and where it does not.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Why should one choose this model?  
1. It does not assume a function of choice when addressing the problem 
case mentioned. 
2. It does not assume that the function of choice has criteria that are 
unknown to the speaker when addressing the problem case mentioned. 
3. It does not presuppose that there is only one specific world (although 
we prefer to commit ourselves to this thesis on other grounds). 
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4. It solves the same problems as the two-dimensional semantics 
framework. 
5. It might make philosophical zombies an epistemic impossibility (a 
subject for a later investigation). 
 
The choice between the humble and the standard alternatives will be likely 
to be made by the philosopher with respect to simplicity and with an eye to 
what the particular issue at stake is. Two-dimensional semantics, as used 
thus far, fits our uses of common terms and is sufficient for discussing twin 
earths, xyz, multiple causation and other important philosophical issues of 
the early 21st century – with the exception, perhaps, of philosophical 
zombies. Here, the concern is not to undermine this model on the basis of 
simplicity or inefficiency but to enrich it with a parallel view that, as far as 
one can perceive, accounts more precisely for the use of language and a 
subject’s beliefs. The price to be paid is a broader realm of worlds in which 
we map primary intensions, and the advantages in terms of accounting for 
beliefs and everyday language are actually obstacles for twin-earth-like 
discussions. From a monist point of view, this cost is a small price to pay if 
Chalmer's arguments can thereby be undermined. Although these two 
models belong to separate realms, both should be widely used in future 
philosophical discussions regarding the relevant subjects.   
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NOTES 
 
1. In fact, if we subscribe to the theory that any permutation of a possible world 
is also a possible world then we could only single out one and only one world if 
provided with one of its complete descriptions.  
2. Chalmers, D. J. (2004). "Epistemic two-dimensional semantics." 
Philosophical Studies 118(1-2): 153-226. 
3. On those worlds without the referent, the function maps the empty set. 
4. One common objection at this point is that if we are constructing the primary 
intension we can demonstratively set what it maps, and set which is the indexical 
world precisely. However, it should be noted that those would be ideal situations 
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unobtainable in most cases. Outside logic, we are much more similar to Joey and 
his incomplete knowledge than to being able to properly set meanings and 
indexicality by fiat. 
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